The "new" theory of the business cycle: are recessions just random? by Larry Butler
Larry Butler*
Business cycles are features of all market-
oriented economies. In the United States, there
have been six recessions since the end ofWorld
WarII,separatedbygenerallylong-lived periods
ofexpansion. Measured from trough to trough,
these cycles have varied inlengthfromjustunder
three years to ten full years. The associated
downturns have varied greatly in severity. Until
the most recent recession, whose trough was
reached in early 1975, it was possible to argue
that government stabilization efforts had be-
come increasingly successful, judging by the
reduction inobservedmovements in income. But
the last recession, the most severe ofthe postwar
period, destroyed any thoughts that we had in
fact learned to control the cycle.
Despite the varying depth and duration of
these business cycles, they have displayed strik-
ing similarities both in the U.S. and in other
market-oriented economies. In each cycle, for
example,
I. the major components of output have
moved together;
2. the output ofproducergoodsandconsum-
er durable goods have fluctuated much
more than the output of non-durable
goods and services; and
3. both wages and profits have moved with
output, although with a greatervariability
in the profitsshareofincome. Thusincome
and itscomponentshavedisplayed a highly
consistent relationship to each otheLl
The principal features of the expansions we
have experienced include the consistency of
income shares and the highly irregular timing of
cyclical turning points. In this article we attempt
to explain thefeature oftiming-why recessions
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occur when they do-which is probably the least
understood feature of the cycle. In fact, both
regularities and erratic timing have been so
pronounced as to require an explanation of
observed cycles, that is, a theory of the cycle.
According to the "new" theory of the cycle
analyzed here, cyclical events can be seen as
arising from random shocks to the economy. In
this paper, we will discuss how such shocks can
generate cycles, and more importantly, why we
should expect them to do so in market econo-
mies.
Our analysis shows, first, that the renewal of
interest in "shock" theories of the cycle stems
from the recent development of the "rational
expectations" literature in economics. Accord-
ing to that view, the public forms expectations,
particularly of prices, which incorporate knowl-
edge of both the economic structure and of the
behavior of policymakers, and may offset the
actions of policymakers. In this context, the
business cycle can only be explained as the
economy's response to "outside" shocks. The
rational explanations approach is closely related
to much of the pre-Keynesian theoretical tradi-
tion. As this development has proceeded, how-
ever, the new expectational models have become
difficult to distinguish from older Keynesian
models, which attempted to explain cycles in
terms of the failure of certain prices to adjust
quickly enough to clear markets (especially the
labor market). The new cycle models provide
important insights, the mostimportantbeingthe
view ofthe cycle as a sequenceofrandomshocks
to the economy. We use a simplified version of
such a model to generate business-cycle fluctua-
tions similar to the ones experienced in the
postwar period.
Despite the challenge of finding a common
explanation for observed cycles and price move-ments, little work on such a theory was done
from the mid-1930's until quite recently. The
reasons for this hiatus are outlined in Section 1
below. Section 2 describes the recent develop-
ment of the rational expectations literature,
which has been the source ofthe recent renewal
of interest in "shock" cycle theory. Section 3
provides a discussion ofthe principlesgoverning
the new "random shocks" cycle model. Finally,
Section 4 provides a description ofa very simple
"new" cycle model.
endogenous and exogenous factors. The structure ofthe
chair is responsible for the fact that irregular shocks are
transformed into fairly regular swings. An ordinarychair
would .ordinarily respond quite differently, although
some kmds of impulse are thinkable (regular pushes and
pulls) which would make it move in regular swings.2
Classical business cycles thus consisted of a
sequence of shocks to an economy which, in
most respects, was able to produce a fairly quick
return to full relative-price equilibrium and thus
full employment.
The Keynesian alternative to this analysis was
developed in the middle and late 1930's, with the
main tools of Keynesian theory in place in l.R.
Hicks' Value and Capital(1939). This disequilib-
rium approach, which drops the classical as-
sumption that all markets clear simultaneously,
has come to characterize almost all macroecon-
omic work since Keynes. Specifically, Keynes
assumed that wages are inflexible downward in
the short run when output is below its full-
employment level, so that a fall in prices leads to
a rise in real wages and a fall in the demand for
labor. This producesan underemploymentequil-
ibrium, which can be eliminated only by aggre-
gate stimulus, in the form ofexpansivefiscal and
monetary policy.
The distinction between the Keynesian and
classical cycle models is illustrated in Chart l.
The curves describe aggregate supply and de-
mand for output as functions ofthe price level.
The principal difference between the two models
lies in the supply curves. The vertical classical
supplycurve (lowerpanel)embodies theassump-
tion thatprices canalwaysadjustto producefull-
employment output. In contrast, the Keynesian
aggregate supply curves (upper panel) assume
the presence ofa rigid wage rate W0' which may
yield a less-than-full-employment level ofoutput
Yu' Expansive policy will shift the demand
schedule to the right and eventually produce full
employment at the level Yf. Inthe bottompanel,
We can compare the economic system with a pendulum
or with a rocking-chair. A rocking-chair may be made to
perform fairly regular swings by quite irregular impulses
(shocks) from outside. (Besides, it may havea mechanism
installed which makes it swing without outside forces
operating on it.) In the explanation of the movement of
the chair we must now distinguish two factors: the
structure ofthe chairand the impulsesfrom theoutside-
I. From Classical to Keynesian Theory
Classical economic theory is based on the
assumption that all prices can move to levels
which equate supply and demand in each mar-
ket. In such a world, people offer labor and
capitalas longas theyfind itto be profitable, and
wages and interest adjust automatically to clear
the labor and capital markets. There are no
unused resources in this world, and in particular
no involuntary unemployment, for the real wage
adjusts to equate the supply ofand the demand
for labor. Though this classical approach pro-
vides an elegant way of showing how relative
prices are determined, it essentially assumes
away the business cycle and thusdoes notfurther
our understanding of the rather large observed
short-term movements in output and employ-
ment.
During the early 1930's and even before
theorists were aware ofthe need for some devic~
which would allow the integration of classical
value theory with the harsh facts about income
and employment fluctuations which character-
ized business cycles. A large business-eycle liter-
ature existed, much ofit focusing on the role of
monetary factors in the cycle. The literature
often emphasized the role ofinstitutional rigidi-
ties in keeping the economic system away from
classical equilibrium, and thus tended to favor
removing such obstacles in order to dampen the
cycle. Much of this work sounds quite modern,
especially in its description of how external
shocks initiate cycles. As a statement ofwhatthe
"new" cycle theory is about, it would be hard to
improve on this passagefrom Gottfried Haberler
(1937):
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recession comes instead from aclassical shock to
supply, which reduces output to Yu. Given the
vertical aggregate supply curve, which reflects
the assumptionofflexible prices, thepriceeffects
ofthe shock work through the economy,andthe
supply curve shifts back to full employment at
the output level Y[-
The Keynesian revolution replaced the quite
sophisticated relative-price mechanism of the
classical model, where wages adjust to clear the
labor market, with the simple assumption that
nominal wages are determined "outside of the
model."Therewas anadvantageto suchashift-
real income is no longer 'always at the full
employment level-but this advantage was pur-
chased at some cost. The relative-price mecha-
nism, with flexible wages playinga majoradjust-
ment role, is the heart of the classical model,
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serving to allocate scarce labor and capital and
also to determine the mix ofoutput. Yet the old
question of integrating such a price mechanism
with a cycle-generating mechanism failed to
surface until the late 1960's, thirtyyears afterthe
Keynesian revolution.
There is a cogent theoretical reason for this
anomaly. Once one accepts the key role of
underemployment disequilibrium in the Keyne-
sian short-term apparatus, it becomes clear that
there is no necessary contradiction between a
Keynesian shortrunand a classical longrun. The
former is characterized by disequilibrium in at
least somemarkets, the latterbyfull equilibrium.
Inparticular, it is easy to devise models in which
an increase in, say, money supply increases real
incomes in the shortrun butaffects onlyprices in
the long. Out of equilibrium, both price and
output respond to a shock; on return to equilibri-
um, only prices are affected by the shock.3
Keynesian theorists, in developing a way of
describing the behavior ofeconomic units which
are not in equilibrium,did not see a clearneed for
a separate cycle theory. Their cycle theory was
one of aggregate demand disequilibrium, with
only a limited role for and no explanation of
price movements.
The disequilibrium-equilibrium dichotomy is
best exemplified in the natural rate hypothesis
(NRH), first presented by Milton Friedman in
1968.4 Suppose the economy is in equilibrium at
some unemployment rate, level of income, and
inflation rate. The NRH says that if there is no
difference between the actual and expected rate
ofinflation, unemployment will be atsomefixed
level, which we define as its natural rate. Ifthe
economy is shocked by, let us say, a permanent
increase in the growth ofmoney, the unemploy-
ment rate will be at its old NRH level when the
economy returns to equilibrium, and all of the
increase in money growth will be translated into
an increase in the rate of inflation. Friedman's
proposition follows entirely from the properties
ofthe classical model. In the absence ofchanges
in taste or technology, the new equilibrium must
be at the same level ofreal income, and thus at
the same level ofunemployment, as the old, and
all oftheincreased moneygrowth mustappearas
an increase in inflation. It is only in the "short
run" that increased money supply will increaseoutput, and thus employment.
TheNRHmakes nodirectstatementaboutthe
way people form expectations; it just assumes
that people do form them, and are correct in the
long run. The NRH can thus be considered a
direct application of Keynesian disequilibrium
theory, early versions ofwhichdatefrom thelate
1930's. The NRH, or something very like it,
should thus have longbeenpartofthe Keynesian
macroeconomic tradition. But until the late
1960's none ofthe main macro-models used any
version of the NRH. Most instead contained a
Phillips curve, which traces a relation between
the rate of inflation and the rate of unemploy-
ment. The principle here differs from the NRH,
which traces a relation between the difference
between the actual and expected rates of infla-
tion and the rate of unemployment. The NRH
thus allows for an accelerating inflation, while
the Phillips curve does not.
The importance of the distinction between
whatpeopleexpect tooccurandwhatdoes occur
cannot be overemphasized. In a pure classical
model, the distinction does not matter, because
people have perfect foresight. But ifthey do not
have perfect foresight, they must have some
means of forming exnectations about their fu-
ture incomes and prices. The major Keynesian
macromodels assume that theseexpectationsare
formed as weighted sums of past values of the
variables themselves. This device has the virtue
of greatly limiting the amount of information
which is relevant to the explanation ofanyone
variable, and therefore makes the specification
and estimation ofparticular equations relatively
easy.
II. Rational Expectations
That Keynesian approach has a drawback,
however, in that it is not based on any notion of
how rational people form expectations. But the
problem can be dealt with by assuming that
people have the ability, based on all currently
available information, to form unbiased esti-
mates offuturequantitiesand prices. Mostofthe
economic theorybased onthis"rationalexpecta-
tions" model is close in spirit to the classical
model.
Suppose someone believes that a certain set of
prices will prevail, and sets his demands accord-
ingly. Then in terms ofexpectedprices, hewillbe
in a classical world. He can be induced to move
away from his equilibrium set of demands for
goods only when actual prices turn out to be
different from his expected price set. If actual
prices are different, he immediatelyincorporates
this new information in his expectations and
moves to a new set of equilibrium demands.
Except for random shocks to his demands
caused by unexpected price movements, he is
always in equilibrium. Moreover, the random
shocks must be unrelated to earlier shocks in
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order for them to affect individual behavior, for
ifthey were not, the information would be built
into the next set of expectations. Because these
shocks are random, there can be no possibility
that a shortfall ofdemand in the current period
will increase the probability ofa furthershortfall
next quarter. In this world, the mere process of
forming expectations prevents business cycles.
The essence of the cycle is a close relation
between successive movements in output, and a
modelwhose responsetoa shockis animmediate
return to equilibrium might not seem to be the
best vehicle for analyzing such cyclical move-
ments. However, that would ignore a key as-
sumption in the analysis, which is that informa-
tion is costless. It is possible to devise models
where all individuals have rational expectations,
but do not adjust fully to new information
because the cost ofacquiringthat information is
too high to be worthwhile. This approachcould
lead to an integrated value and cycle theory,
where everyone responds rationally to available
price and output data, and yet where short-term
output movements are not necessarily random.m. Random Shocks Model
A basicwayofintroducingnon-randomerrors
is to place some limitation on the amount of
information people have at their disposal. Sup-
pose, for instance, that my information set does
notinclude the price ofnatural gas in New York.
Ifashortageofgas develops in New Yorkandthe
pricegoes up there, I shouldinprinciplerespond
to the increase immediately. ButifIdonotknow
ofthe shortage, or if I do not know how it will
affect California prices, I will have no response
until the New York price increase spills over to
the California market. The aggregate response
will be a relatively slow adjustment in both price
and quantity, as information about a shock in
one segment of the economy slowly becomes
reflected in prices in all segments. Shocks will
affect output over a span of time, and move-
ments in output will be a moving sum of a
number ofsuccessive shocks and will be related.
That is, a cycle will be possible. Placingarbitrary
limits on the information sets available to trans-
actors is not elegant theoretically, but it does
yield the real world's highly correlated errors.
Edmund Phelps' labor-market theory, utiliz-
ing the natural rate hypothesis,s indicates how
the arbitrariness in this problem ofinformation
content can be eliminated. Unlike Friedman,
Phelps and his followers have emphasized the
short-run, ratherthanthelong-run, propertiesof
the NRH. In Phelps' approach, most of the
emphasis has been onthe role ofsearchandother
costs offinding employment, which implies that
people bargain about their incomes rather than
about their wages. For example, a construction
worker with a high probability ofbeing laid off
during bad weather is likely to insist ona higher
wage rate than a factory worker with the same
skills, to compensate for working fewer hours.
Thus, there is a conscious tradeoff between the
wage rate and the probability of being laid off.
This result implies that expectations primarily
concern quantities rather than price. For what
people do is to maximize the value ofthe stream
of their future wages, taking into account any
future loss from unemployment. In this environ-
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ment, despite the rationality of expectations of
both prices and quantities, there is no preSump-
tion that adjustment toa new classical equilibri-
um will be instantaneous. It is hardto.tell this
world from Keynes' (or, more properlY,Hicks')
on any matter of principle, except that the
rational-expectations literature would. add one
requirement: that the model.used should itself
generate the expectations of the variables in
question. Though such a model need notcontain
the simple, uncorrelated errors of the pure ra-
tional expectations model, we could interpret(as
that literature does) the observed errors in the
model as a sequence of random shocks to the
economy.
As has been known for some time, random
events in time series can generate cyclical move-
ments which have a close resemblance to eco-
nomic cycles. Also, a great portion ofthe move-
ment in most economic time series can be
explained by the series' past history. Because the
logic behind the rational-expectations approach
involves the ability of transactors to reduce
errors in observed price and output forecasts to
randomness, the main contribution of this ap-
proach may be its ability to explain these corre-
lated error processes and at the same time pro-
vide a reasonably good explanation of the
business cycle. Yet we cannot be sure that this
approachwill provideanadequatedescriptionof
cyclical movements. The difficultyofprovidinga
reasonable expectational interpretation of a
model increases enormously with the number of
separateerrorswe mustconsider, as does also the
difficulty of estimating very general lag struc-
tures. A general 12-variable model of output
with 10 lags on each variable would require the
estimation of 12x10=120 parameters, and thus
would exhaust the available quarterly postwar
data. The basic approach, then, must consist of
capturing as much movement as possible in a
small number ofvariables, as we attempttodo in
the following model, which contains only one
relevant random error.IV. A Simple Model
The effect on income of any such shock will
dissipate only slowly. It will be felt first through
its direct impact, then in the following quarter
throughits effect on the y-1 term, in the quarter
afterthat through its effect on both y-Iandy-2,
and so on, with the equation used as a forecaster
of longer and longer periods ahead. The results
ofsucha forecast sequenceare given in the table
below. This model is compatiblewithshort-term
restoration ofprice equilibrium to the economy,






The model is also compatible with one of the
broader cyclical generalizations-the much
greater amplitude of movements in investment
thanofmovements inconsumption. In the short
run, the impact of any shock to income falls
entirely oninvestment, becauseconsumptionis a
fixed function of past income. As the model
transmits shocks, they appear initially as unan-
ticipated investment, and are then built into
consumption over a span oftime. Two consecu-
tive large negative shocks to real income-a
recession, by the normal definition-will pro-
duce a large decline in realinvestmentandonlya
small movement in consumption.
How well does this simple model describe the
cyclical movements ofthe past several decades?
The standard error ofthe above equation, fitted
Suppose the path ofreal income through time
can be described entirely by its past history, as
follows:
(I)y = .09y* + lAY_l - A9Y_2 + e, where
y is real income,
y* is the trend level of real income at a
3\;2-percent annual trend growth,
y-l and y-2 are past values of this real-
income deviation from trend, and
e is random error, uncorrelated with its
own past values.6
We may ask two questions:
a. Is there a plausible world where this model
holds?
b. Howwell does the model explainobserved
business cycles?
The answer is yes to the first question. Sup-
pose the world to be a place where the citizenry
fixes its real consumption expenditure as a
percentage "a" of its expected income.? Then
rational expectations would indicate that
c =aye =a(.09y* + lAy-1 - A9y-2)
If we next assume that the rest of income is i,
equal to investment plus government expendi-
ture, then
i = y-c =(I-a) (.09y* + 1.4Y_l - A9Y_2) + e
This simple model is compatible with both
classical theory and certain empirical observa-
tions on the business cycle. First, real income is
independent of nominal magnitudes in the long
run, and even in the short run is randomly
shocked by those magnitudes only through their
impact on the errorterm. In thelongrun(say, 20
quarters ahead), the expected value of real in-
come is y*, the trend level of real income. This
fact is compatible with Keynesian and classical
theory, and alsowiththenaturalrate hypothesis.
But the model also says that a rise in nominal
magnitudes, such as monetary or fiscal policy
variables, will exert a single-period shock effect
on the real economy, through its potentialeffect
on the random error term. The model incorpo-
rates fiscal or monetary influences intothiserror
term by assuming that the size ofthese effects is

























.52eOThus the relation tends to slightly understate the
frequency oflongrecessions,and tooverstatethe
frequency of short recessions.
The real problem, though, lies in the predic-
tion ofrecovery periods. Each ofthe 5recessions
in the 1952-75 period, including the most recent
one, has been followed by about six quarters of
extremely high economic growth. The model
simply failed to pick up these fluctuations. The
model predicts relatively slow turnarounds in
real growth rates, so that (for example) a two-
quarter recession followed by three quarters of
very high real growth would be marginally less
probable than a recession offive quarters. And
as the table indicates, the model predicts nosuch
lengthY recessions.
The explanation has to do with the nature of
simple autoregressive schemes. Whatever their
virtues, such schemes tendto say thata variable's
level next quarterwill be quite similar to its level
this quarter. In rate-of-growth terms, our equa-
tion says that this quarter's expected growthrate
for GNP will equal 60 percent of the trend
growth of 3Y2 percent plus 40 percent of last
quarter's actual growth, plus a small weight
moving the level ofincome backtoward its trend
line.9 So ina fundamental way, theequationdoes
not have the capacity to produce large quarter-
to-quarter swings in the level ofincome, though
the relatively high standard error suggests the
occurrence of large unsystematic swings in
growth rates. Thus the model reproduces the
observed short, sharp pattern of recessionary
decline with more precisionthanit does thelong,
high growth pattern of early recovery.
We have argued thateven thissimple random-
shocks model-a type favored in the"new"cycle
theory-can be used to generate behavior which
is strongly reminiscent of some of the main
characteristics ofthe observed business cycle. It
does so imperfectly, and in particular somewhat
understates the duration ofthe typicaldownturn
and the strength of the ensuing early recovery.
But this model assumes a single-source random
event, which must thus incorporate every aspect
of random influence on the economy from the
ordinary monetary and fiscal shocks to world
commodity-price booms. Because of the fre-
quent difference in character of these different
influences, it should be possible to improve on
the single-shock model by providing a better

















to quarterly U.S. datafor the 1952-75 period (96
quarters), is 4.0 percent ofGNP, with an annual
trend growth in income of 3.5 percent ofGNP.
These figures may be used to indicate how well
the model describes actual cycles. Based on the
relation between trend growth and standard
error, the probability of anyone observation
showing an actual decline in income is .19,8 and
thus 18 quartersofdecline(.19 x96) should occur
in the period of fit. There actually were 18
quarters ofdecline in theobservationperiod, but
this is true almost by definition. The method of
fit was designed to produceempirically uncorre-
lated errors, with high and low errors in roughly
the frequency predicted by the bell-shaped curve
of the normal statistical distribution.
More interesting is how well the equation
predicts a second decline following the first-
that is, the actual occurrence of a recession,
defined as two quarters ofconsecutive decline in
real GNP. Because the equation's lagged GNP
terms make for a very sluggish GNP response to
the first decline, the second decline is considera-
bly more likely than the first, with a probability
of .38. The probability of two consecutive de-
clines is thus .19x. 38 = .073. The equation thus
"predicts" .073 x96=7recessions in theperiod,in
contrast to the 5 recessions which actually oc-
curred.
Where the equation begins to slip is in predict-
ing longer recessions. Similar, thoughsomewhat
more involved, calculations of the type used
above yield for the 1952-75 period:
Predicted
Number
12V. Summary and Conclusions
Interest ina"new"business-cycle model began
with the development of rational-expectations
models in the late 1960's. In these models, it was
found that with complete (or nearly complete)
information, rational transactors would act in a
way which would reduce observed errors in both
prices and quantities to uncorrelated random
noise. In the case ofnon-randomerrors, transac-
tors would incorporate their information in
succeeding price forecasts. No cycle, in the ordi-
nary sense, would be possible. The next step in
developing a cyclical model involved the at-
tempt, by now largely successful, to provide
limitations onthe informationavailableto trans-
actors, which would allow for serially correlated
observations in quantities and perhaps prices as
well.
We argued initially that, in light ofthis devel-
opment, it has become much harderto tell these
models apart from the much older (and numer-
ous) Keynesian disequilibrium models. Models
which embody both rational expectations and
slow adjustment are clearly feasible. Inthe work
ofPhelps and others, quantitydisequilibrium in
the labor market results from discontinuous
search and transactions costs ofvarious kinds-
factors which tend to limit the information
available to transactors in that market. And in
the rational-expectations model with correlated
errors, quantities at least do not fully adjust to
FOOTNOTES
1. The consistency of these similarities is documented by
Herbert Runyon in this issue of the Review.
2. Gottfried Haberler, Prosperity and Depression, Geneva,
League of Nations, 1939. His book is perhaps theculmination of
theclassical cycle-theorytradition. With its latedate, itcontains
an extensive discussion of Keynesian theory, but little refer-
encetotheformaldisequilibrium theorywhich was then emerg-
ing.
3. This statement summarizes what Samuelson calls the "neo-
classical synthesis" of Keynesian and classical theory.
4. Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American
Economic Review, 1968, pp. 1-17.
5. Edmund Phelps, "Money-wageDynamicsand Labor-Market
Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, 1968, pp. 678-711.
Friedman and Phelps are given credit forsimultaneous author-
ship of the NRH. It is of course a feature of the older classical
model as well.
6. This relation is in fact the best description of real income
solely in terms of its past values and arandom error, as fitted by
Box-Jenkins methods to real GNP data for the 1952-75 period.
7. This formulation is a very simple version of the standard
behavioral explanation of movements in consumption, the
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shocks instantly, so that this model fits into the
Hicksian dichotomy between short-term dis-
equilibrium and long-term equilibrium. More-
over, Phelps' argument is essentially that people
bargain over their incomes and not their wages,
trading future layoffs against wage increases.
Thus the formation of rational quantity (and
price) expectations adds one requirement to the
usual disequilibrium model, that the model itself
generate expectations. In that event, it will be
possible to interpret observed errors as they are
interpreted in the "new" cycle theory (and in our
simple model), as a sequence of random shocks
to the economy.
The principal achievement ofthe "new" cycle
model is an accurate description of cyclical
timing. In the context ofour very simple model,
there is no problem in explaining why recessions
are short, sharp, and irregular in timing. The
timing factor suggests that the economy is sub-
ject to random shocks from a variety ofsources,
and that these will sometimes be severe enough
to generate recessions. Further, ifthe shocks are
in fact random, the recessions we observe will in
fact be short and sharp. The major thingmissing
from our simple model is an adequate descrip-
tion of Haberler's "rocking chair": the percep-
tionofthe economyembodied in the model is too
simple to explain how the economy works itself
out of recession.
permanent-income hypothesis. For a more detailed expiana-
tion of the relation between permanent income and rational-
expectations hypothesis, see Kurt Dew, "Market Response to
Economic Policies," this Review, Fall 1976, pp. 20-30.
8. This calculation assumes normally distributed errors with a
mean of 3.5 percent and a standard error of 4.0 percent. Zero
growth in the calculation is .88 standard errors belowthemean,
and 19 percent of the normal distribution is more than .88
standard errors less than the mean.
9. This small weight is what gives the model its long-run
classical properties.
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